



Human Error Modeling Predictions: Air MIDAS Human Performance Modeling of T-NASA

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
Background




- Striving for:
 - Accurate understanding of human performance, contextual effects and operational safety in complex operating environments (error causation and automation interaction).
 - Accurate behavioral onset description using performance modifiers.
 - Resultant system-safety related effects.
- Supports an understanding of safety-related conceptual mechanisms.
- Application area for the augmentation of existing Human Performance Models.


Modeling Interaction Levels of Analyses

New Models & Functions






Integrated Models - Composition




Air MIDAS Integrated Representation



Air MIDAS Output

- Human performance values for the interaction between multiple human agents, the system and the environment (emergent performance):

- Perceptual demands
- Operator attention demands
- Cognitive loading
- Memory representations
- Procedural-related information
 - Scheduling, degradation, shedding
 - Time to complete
 - Timeline information





Purpose of HEM Project



- Undertake tasks to develop a validated model of human error behavior applied to surface operations.
- Generate predictions of human performance interacting with advanced technologies designed to improve the safety of surface operations (Taxiway Navigation and Situation Awareness/T-NASA display suite).



Human Error



- Traditionally has been studied in an incidental (reactive) fashion
 - Result - difficulty defining/researching human error.
- Recently human error has been central in much research surrounding human performance.
 - Definition of Human Error has been evolving

Evolution timeline

- 1920's – Mechanistic - view of simply being the output of incorrect performance.
- 1960's – Cognitive - being the result of more detailed cognitive factors
- 1970's – Information processing - An interaction between the physical and cognitive worlds.
- Current – Information processing from a system perspective, context effects.




Human Error - Definition




- Situations or events where undesirable consequences occur and where the cause can be attributed in whole or in part to human action (Hollnagel, 1993).
- Augmented to include the contextual components behind human action and human cognition as opposed to solely referring to incorrect human actions (Hollnagel, 2000).

Contextual Control Theory Modes



Human Error Modeling System Vulnerabilities






T-NASA Error Types (Hooley & Foyle, 2001)



- Planning Errors:
 - Incorrectly writing down.
 - Reading back clearance.
- Decision/Execution Errors:
 - Time pressure: FO head down (Jepp chart), Captain continues navigation from Captain's incorrect mental map.
 - Interruptions: FO head down leaving one agent responsible for correct local guidance, navigation is affected when interrupted.

Model Operational Environment



- Single scenario.
- Baseline operations.
- Chicago O'Hare.
- Route - NH3.
- Other Traffic - None.
- Communication - Voice.
- “Major Errors” types.



Procedural Overview




Captain	First Officer	ATC (Tower&Ground)
<p><i>Based on the turn-off instruction, the Captain might have expectations regarding their taxi route, which might influence his/her decisions later i.e. confirmation bias, heuristic—same for FO</i></p>	<p><i>Before all of this (in the air), the FO was supposed to refer to the taxi chart to gain an awareness of where the expected turn-off was situated in relation to the airport configuration</i></p>	
<p>While navigating turn-off</p>	<p>Do: (order depends on time, A/C positioning i.e. whether still approaching HS bar or not or whether ATC responded yet)</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Keeps navigating or is waiting on HS bar by now <input type="checkbox"/> Listens to taxi route clearance (depending on load) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Contacts Tower of clearing runway and location <input type="checkbox"/> Switches frequency to Ground <input type="checkbox"/> Contacts Ground regarding clearing runway and location <input type="checkbox"/> Waits for a response (clearance) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Tower ATC gives frequency for Ground ATC <input type="checkbox"/> Ground ATC gives taxi route when ready (<i>this message might be given right away or it might take them longer</i>)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Keeps navigating or is at HS bar by now <input type="checkbox"/> Listens to taxi route clearance (depending on load) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Writes down taxi route <input type="checkbox"/> Reads back taxi route to Ground 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Ground ATC might acknowledge the confirmation, but might not
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> If already stopped, may start on taxi route <i>while</i> discussing with FO (<i>this would probably mean that the Captain had heard the first route instructions and thought s/he knew how to start off—and was probably under time pressure to do so</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Discusses taxi route with Captain 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Visually reference chart if unsure/lack of local and/or global awareness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Visually references chart 	



Scenario - Operational Environment




Human Performance Decision Error (Hoey & Foyle 2001)/
Opportunistic Errors (Hollnagel, 1993) Model Specification



Air MIDAS Activity Input

- A procedural example: The parent activity





Air MIDAS Initialization Input



- Sub activities (child activities) of parent

```

Initialization Editor
File Edit View Options
Name: Update_taxiRoute      (UPDATE-UWR)
Documentation: (HEM)

Parent Slots for Eval_Taxi_Route:
DOER
INFORMATION-GOAL
INTERRUPTION-SPECS
NOT-INTERRUPTABLE-P
PRIORITY
TASK-ID

Child Initargs for Update_taxiRoute:
DOER
DURATION-SPECS
ESTIMATED-DURATION
INFORMATION-GOAL
INTERRUPTION-SPECS
NEW-VALUES
NODE-COUNT-FOR-UWR
NODES-FOR-UWR
NOT-INTERRUPTABLE-P
PRIORITY
RESET-DAEMONS
TASK-ID
UWR-ATTRIBUTES
UWR-NODES
VACM-LOAD
WM-ACCESS-TIME

Values for Update_taxiRoute:
< ** Inherited ** >
(2 1 0 0)
100
< ** No Value ** >
(RESUME INTERRUPTING-ACTIV
< ** No Value ** >
< ** Inherited ** >
< ** No Value ** >
< ** No Value ** >
< ** No Value ** >
(0 0 4 0)
0

L: Edit Name And Doc; R: Menu.

```



Error Structures: Expected Results



- Error 1: Memory loss due to timing:
 - Memory decays as time increases at each node level.
 - If no recovery from scrambled mode, strategic mode intervention from ATC agent occurs. If late, simple heuristic 1 straight line to gate is enacted by FC.

Example of Code

```
(defmethod forget-node-attributes ((node uwr-node) current-time
                                   reason-for-forgetting)
  "Forget all data attributes of node and put reason in forgotten datums."
  (when (attributes node)
    (display-debug *sim-exec* #format
      "~%~% In FORGET-NODE-ATTRIBUTES: node ~a is being ~
      forgotten at time ~a with reason = ~a~%~%"
      (get-node-name node)
      current-time
      reason-for-forgetting)
    (loop for datum in (attributes node) do
      (setf (datum-forgotten datum)
            (cons current-time reason-for-forgetting)))
    (setf (forgotten-data node)
          (append (attributes node) (forgotten-data node))
          (attributes node) nil)))
```

- Mechanism - temporal and capacity constrained Working Memory (WM) buffer.



Error Structures: Expected Results



- Error 2: Memory Loss due to overload:
 - Primacy effect - not writing the information down, causes the first bit of information to be forgotten, results in “planning error”.
 - Confusion/loss of SA activates respective heuristic (depending on the conditions/rules).

**Example
of Code**

```
(defun compute-decayed-activation-level (current-activation-level
                                         elapsed-time-in-secs
                                         decay-rate-in-secs)
  "Compute new activation level based on current level, time elapsed ~
  in secs and per-second decay rate."
  (- current-activation-level (* decay-rate-in-secs elapsed-time-in-secs)))
```

- HEM application of the Air MIDAS heuristic of shared intent failure.



Error Structures: Expected Results



- Error 3: Time pressure and COCOM switch
 - Heuristic 1 (uncertainty, crew does a cross check) and heuristic 2 (time pressure and uncertainty crew takes immediate action).
 - Situation: Pilot moves aircraft immediately without fully understanding the direction.
- Mechanism - COCOM switching - ratio of number of goals:time available



Air MIDAS Contextual Parameters



- Planning mode switching ratio (# of simultaneous goals:time available).
 - < 37 secs/goal: unplanned
 - 37 - 52 secs/goal: tactical
 - > 52 secs/goal: strategic
- Rules
 - **strategic mode performance** - Captain performs a cross check with First Officer
 - **scrambled mode performance** - Captain hears information and performs an action without a full understanding of the direction selected.



Error Structures: Expected Results



- Confirmation Bias
 - Flight crew default uncertainty = taking direct routing to goal location.
 - Confirmation bias - Pilot receives confirmation from the environment (hits Delta taxiway this acts to confirm the direction chosen).
- Mechanism - supported by the ability to add probabilistic decision making.



Error Structures: Generalizability



- Team Air MIDAS has been working to create a generalizable generative function allowing emergence across different scenarios.
- NH3 results will be generalizable to other “major errors” in the environment.
 - Flight crew went directly to the gate with fewer turns on 83% of the time across all T-NASA scenarios.
 - Suggested that when major errors were made and crew lost SA, and reverted to going directly to their goal location.



Air MIDAS Optimization




- Memory Buffer and Scheduler within Air MIDAS
 - Significant programming issues - legacy code:
 - Low level, very detailed programming required.
 - Desire for higher level, less detailed but equally valid output.
 - Software/structural modifications made to:
 - Allow multi-programmer.
 - Permit ease of use.
 - Increase ease of validation efforts.
 - Increase usability of the software.
 - LISP-LINUX finished, LINUX-Windows Commenced



Status Update



Description	Commenced	Completed
Scenario identification		
Scenario specification		
Procedural specification		
Procedural coding		
Equipment coding		
Environmental coding		
Analytic model		
Implementation of model		





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Questions/Discussion

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